Graveyard of Empiricism

An article co-authored with Javid Ahmad appeared on the Af-Pak Channel on foreignpolicy.com on December 13, 2011. Excerpts are below. The full article can be read here.

A number of questionable assumptions about the Afghan people - concerning their attitudes to foreigners, their history, their society and their values - go unchallenged. Historical analogies and socio-economic data are regularly manipulated by various parties to validate their own biases and preconceptions, and readings of Afghan history are, when not completely erroneous, unapologetically Western-centric. For example, one common view that has gained circulation among think tankers, policymakers, and Congressional staffers, is that a majority of Afghans are inherently hostile to the United States. And yet, this viewpoint is not borne out by polling data, however imperfect. The last poll conducted by ABC News, the BBC and ARD German TV, for example, says that nearly seven in 10 Afghans support the presence of U.S. forces in their country.

Another, perhaps more damaging, misperception is of Afghanistan as the ‘Graveyard of Empires': a historically insignificant strategic backwater where great civilizations - inevitably European ones - ended up mired in ruinous war. But even a cursory examination of the region's history makes a mockery of this now entrenched concept. During his conquests, Alexander of Macedon spent about two years solidifying his control of what is today Afghanistan and Central Asia, referred to in his day as Bactria and Sogdiana. In fact, his army chose to reverse its course in today's Punjab, over two hundred miles to modern Afghanistan's east, after the Battle of the Hydaspes. The 19th century British Empire, despite an initial setback, won subsequent engagements against the Afghans in its bid to create a buffer zone to British India's northwest. And the defeat of the Soviet military in the 1980s was only made possible with American, Pakistani, and Saudi support.

The Graveyard of Empires canard also largely ignores non-Western history. Ancient and medieval Afghanistan was in fact at the heart of a number of major civilizations, including the Greek Bactrian states, the Kushan Empire, which was a contemporary of imperial Rome, and the Ghaznavid sultanate from the 10th to 12th centuries, whose rulers made regular military forays into the subcontinent. The great Mughal Empire, at its zenith perhaps the most prosperous realm on earth, had its foundations in what is today's Afghanistan, when its progenitor Babur established a presence in the region between Kabul and Peshawar. Count, on top of all this, several centuries of sustained Persian rule over the region.

At Bonn, Half of Winning Was Just Showing Up

My article co-authored with Javid Ahmad appeared as a German Marshall Fund 'Transatlantic Take' on December 8, 2011. The full text can be read here.

World and Afghan leaders convened in Bonn earlier this week, a decade after that city hosted the first major conference to chart Afghanistan’s future following the ousting of the Taliban. Key priorities on the Bonn 2011 agenda naturally included the ongoing security transition to Afghan forces, reconciliation with the Taliban and armed insurgent groups, and the continuing international commitment to Afghanistan. Considerable emphasis was also placed on the country’s political and human development — particularly women, health, and corruption — and the durability of the Afghan economy. But while symbolism overshadowed any substantive developments, the summit’s participation provided a good sense of the ever-evolving strategic contours of the Afghan conflict.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai initiated discussions with an impassioned (if obligatory) plea for continued assistance from the international community. Only the week before, he had unveiled the second phase of the Afghan security transition, which would result in Afghan security forces assuming security responsibility for over 50 percent of the country. This had followed a consultative Loya Jirga, where more than 2,000 representatives agreed unanimously to support enduring relations with the international community, including the United States. Both developments marked important steps as Afghanistan prepares itself for a lighter Western military footprint, and were repeatedly referenced at Bonn.

Of greater significance at the summit, however, was the high-level official representation from the transatlantic community, which clearly indicated the West’s continued commitment to Afghanistan at a time when economic and political challenges at home might suggest looking inward, rather than at important challenges farther afield. While leaders generally avoided addressing the specifics of any long-term commitments to Afghanistan — such as a notional U.S. security agreement until 2024 — U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did emphasize that “2014 doesn’t mean that the Afghan Security Forces are totally on their own,” a sentiment that was echoed in the joint statement issued at the conference’s conclusion. The United States and its NATO allies also made specific promises to help with Afghanistan’s reconstruction and institutional capacity.

Perhaps just as consequential as the West’s reassurances was Pakistan’s absence. Its boycott was the result of last month’s NATO strike in Mohmand, which resulted in over two dozen of its soldiers being killed. That clash and Pakistan’s response — coming soon after the assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, blamed on Pakistan-based militants — have further eroded the pretense of its being a supportive ally in efforts to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Tuesday’s attack in Kabul on the Shi’a holy day of Ashura, which resulted in over 55 deaths and was claimed by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, also points to a dangerous new strain of sectarian violence spilling over from Pakistan.

Finally, the high-level presence of other regional actors — Iran, India, and China — proved a good indicator of the importance these powers accord to Afghanistan irrespective of the United States’ and NATO’s presence there. Karzai singled out Iran’s position at Bonn as a particularly positive indicator of Tehran’s intentions toward Afghanistan, but Iran’s statement also underscored the difficulty of reconciling its cooperation on Afghanistan with growing U.S. and European concern over its clandestine nuclear development. The delegation from India, which recently signed a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, highlighted the continuing challenge Afghanistan faces from cross-border terrorism. Meanwhile, China’s foreign minister stressed the need to bolster Afghanistan’s sovereignty and autonomy, a careful message that conveniently lends itself to contradictory interpretations: Afghanistan’s independence from U.S. influence and security provisions on one hand, and its ability to counter Pakistani proxies on the other.

The Bonn summit may not have led to any concrete breakthroughs. The conference conclusions were not unexpected, and indicated a shared commitment to upholding the Afghan constitution, political institutions, and human rights; supporting Afghan security (including on counterterrorism and counternarcotics) after 2014; promoting Afghan-led political reconciliation under strict conditions; bolstering economic growth with international assistance; and facilitating regional normalization and integration. While such lofty ambitions may not necessarily result in the eradication of Afghanistan’s daunting challenges, they will help shape the country’s uncertain future. The responsibility for a stable and secure Afghanistan rests ultimately with its people, and the summit was simply a demonstration of continued faith in the country’s future. But, as they say, half of winning is just showing up. And at Bonn, the international community — with one notable exception — did.

Wishful Mud-Slinging

The following column appeared in the Indian Express on December 2, 2011.

Coming only days after the dramatic exit of Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, the November 26 NATO assault on two Pakistani outposts in the Mohmand Agency has led to a further deterioration in US-Pakistani relations. Although the major implications may not be very different, this incident has been unlike other setbacks this year in transcending the strictly bilateral, and directly involving the United States’ NATO allies as well as Afghanistan’s security forces.

But as with many such episodes related to Pakistan over the past few years, the exact details continue to be hotly disputed. In the absence of credible investigations or after-action reports by state authorities, or reliable independent reporting by the local media, the full facts may never be properly established, even though US and NATO forces have promised an investigation of their own. The US, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, has expressed regret for the incident and the White House has made efforts to convince Pakistan to reverse its decision to boycott next week’s Bonn Conference, where it had been expected to play the role of a pivotal stakeholder.

And yet, none of these gestures has stopped what has now become a predictable pattern of assertions and accusations. Pakistan has seen nationwide protests fed by a largely unquestioning and vitriolic press and repeated assertions by senior Pakistani army officers that NATO’s attack was deliberate. NATO and Afghan officials have countered that the Pakistani forces initiated the engagement, thereby preventing the hot pursuit of militants across the Durand Line. The American ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, subsequently relayed to Washington that a direct apology from President Obama would be required to placate the public furore, but the White House — frustrated by Pakistan’s antics, sceptical of Pakistani blamelessness, and worried about the political optics in the backdrop of next year’s elections — has balked at the suggestion.

Wherever the blame lies for the 28 deaths in Mohmand, the timing of the incident — and, even more importantly, the stage-managed free-fall into which it has set US-Pakistan relations — appears almost too convenient. Pakistani umbrage has ensured a suspension of NATO supply lines to Afghanistan, led to its insistence that the US vacate the Shamsi airfield in Balochistan (whose use by the US Pakistan had previously denied) and provided a fait accompli for Pakistan to undermine any positive outcomes of the forthcoming Bonn conference. Furthermore, it coincides with rumoured peace talks between Pakistan and factional leaders of the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan, who have reportedly made the withdrawal of the army from the agency and a break in US-Pakistan relations preconditions for a settlement.

Where does all this leave Washington? As Americans would say, between a rock and a hard place. With the self-imposed deadline for the military surge coinciding with severe budget cuts, popular anti-war protests and a presidential election cycle, the urgency behind seeking an appropriate end-state in Afghanistan and its region is unprecedented. This is complicated by a number of uncertainties pertaining to the nature and extent of the long-term US presence in Afghanistan, American end goals and red lines and the exact objectives and feasibility of US engagement with various Taliban factions. Furthermore, American assessments of the situation on the ground are themselves increasingly contested. Intelligence estimates reportedly paint a much dimmer picture of the durability of US military gains in Afghanistan than the claims made in public, although field commanders and US diplomats in Kabul have privately disputed such assessments.

Against this backdrop, the increasing recklessness of Pakistan’s security establishment resembles a high-risk game being played with fewer chips and a weak hand. Although the official reaction to the Mohmand incident by the White House, the State Department and NATO headquarters has sought to minimise the fallout, it is unclear whether the break in Pakistan’s relationship with the US will be temporary or whether it is in any way reversible. US officials still seem to believe it is, but that may well be the result of the same wishful thinking that has sustained the precarious US-Pakistan relationship for over a decade.

A Strong Case to Drop India Uranium Ban

My post on the Australian uranium ban appeared on The Interpreter, the blog of the Lowy Institute for Public Policy, on December 2, 2011. An excerpt is below. Click here for the full text.

While cogent cases have already been made for reversing Australia's stance on diplomatic and security grounds, MV Ramana's criticism, citing non-proliferation concerns, is intriguing.

In the strictest sense, he is right: Australia on its own can't guarantee that India will adhere to world-class safety standards or non-proliferation norms. But he's incorrect in assuming that Australia won't make a difference. In fact, there's already been a shift in India's behaviour following the Nuclear Suppliers Group's decision to exempt it in 2008. India's approach to the non-proliferation regime at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva on such matters as a fissile material cut-off is but one notable example.

India's shift in position has also helped convince a previously sceptical Obama Administration of the merits of the controversial deal brokered under George W Bush. Moreover, the US-India nuclear deal has not resulted in the dire predictions made by many non-proliferation specialists (including those cited by Ramana) about India rushing to build nuclear weapons once unencumbered by the global nuclear export regime. In fact, India's decision not to upgrade or even replace its primary sources of weapons-grade plutonium suggests a continuing commitment to its existing deterrent.

The Rocky Road to Damascus

The following article originally appeared in The Indian Express on November 16, 2011.

No country is ever immune to charges of double standards in its foreign policy, and this year’s popular uprisings across West Asia and North Africa — often collectively referred to as the “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening” — have exposed many such contradictions in both rhetoric and behaviour. Last week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was forced to defend her government’s reluctance to intervene in Syria, where, according to UN estimates, the eight-month government crackdown has resulted in more than 3,500 deaths and over 23,000 refugees fleeing to Turkey and Lebanon. Citing the need to protect US allies and forces, secure energy supplies from the region, and combat terrorist groups, Clinton resisted calls by many compatriots to replicate the kind of military intervention that unseated the late Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Left unsaid were the complications Damascus can still cause for US interests in neighbouring Lebanon.

The US-Syria relationship has long been somewhat anomalous in a region characterised either by tight US alliances or sharp adversarial relationships with Washington. On the one hand, relations between Washington and Damascus have been shaped by the history of the Cold War, longstanding differences over Israel, economic sanctions, charges of sponsoring terrorism or regime change, and Syria’s periodic attempts at developing weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the two countries have maintained fitful diplomatic relations with one another, collaborated on specific regional diplomatic or security challenges, and even aligned against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War.

The last few days have seen a shift in the fortunes of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime, with the nearly unanimous decision by the Arab League to suspend Syria marking an apparent turning point. This move was followed by further international sanctions against the country, and a public statement by Jordan’s King Abdullah urging Assad to step down. Pro-Assad elements responded to these developments by attacking several diplomatic missions in Damascus. While the US may still be hesitant to use force in a bid to actively depose Assad for the very reasons Clinton outlined, these recent events — and the flurry of diplomatic consultations taking place in their wake — suggest that Assad will only find himself further isolated.

India too has staked out a default position on Syria. In August, when India presided over the UN Security Council after a gap of almost two decades, it opted for an exceedingly cautious approach to the Syrian protests, and subsequently abstained during a key October vote. More than the vote itself, India, as on other occasions during its current UNSC tenure, presented a weak justification for its decision, citing reports of violence perpetrated by protesters against Syrian security forces as a reason to take a more measured stand. At a similar juncture in the Libyan uprising, Indian officials had pointed to the lack of adequate information as the basis for Delhi’s decision to abstain at the Security Council.

There are several reasons — some defensible — for India’s position. As with Libya, the security of Indian citizens and interests cannot be easily jeopardised. The government also appears far too preoccupied with a plethora of domestic concerns to risk what it sees as unnecessary controversy over a foreign policy issue. Finally, based on experiences in its own neighbourhood, India is suspicious about the feasibility of spreading democratic values. National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon said, “A people cannot be forced to be free or to practice democracy.”

And yet there are several reasons for India to reconsider its traditional stance, even if ideological or humanitarian reasons were to be temporarily set aside. The Arab world’s overwhelming support for Syrian opposition groups renders weak the logic of remaining sensitive to the Muslim electorate at home. In any case, supporting the removal of an authoritarian secular leader of a majority Muslim state should never be reflexively construed as an anti-Muslim decision. Moreover, with considerable diplomatic capital being invested in a bid for permanent UN Security Council membership, India should be better attuned to the expectations which that privilege entails. Abstaining on key decisions as a UNSC member is hardly a marker of leadership, and weakens Delhi’s claims to what it sees as its rightful position in global affairs. Finally, India’s own growing security amid increasing regional instability means the possibility of India having to intervene in another country is today far greater than that of India being at the receiving end of such an intervention. With an eye on the future, setting a precedent for intervention on dire humanitarian grounds may be prudent.

According to Christian mythology, it was on the highway to Damascus that the Apostle Paul saw the proverbial light, resulting in his conversion to Christianity. As the US and other countries calibrate their own approaches to the Syrian crackdown, India should be prepared for a rocky diplomatic road ahead, one that hopefully leads to further enlightenment concerning the onerous burdens of global leadership.

Pulling U.S.-Pakistan Policy out of the Shadows

My post on U.S. Pakistan policy appeared on Foreign Policy's Af-Pak Channel on September 30, 2011. An excerpt is below. The full text can be accessed here.

The big difference between the 1990s and today is the presence and role of the United States in South Asia. In the 90s, Washington was completely disengaged from the region, turning a blind eye to the rise of the Taliban and even indicating an interest in doing business with them, all of which resulted in the unfortunate consequences he details. But 9/11 permanently changed all that: the United States can no longer afford to completely disengage from the region. Actively containing Pakistan is an entirely different prospect from ignoring and sanctioning the country. As such, Washington cannot presume that a tougher line on Pakistan today will have the same consequences that it did in the years before 9/11.

On balance, Washington probably underestimates its leverage with Pakistan. The United States has an unparalleled range of military, diplomatic, economic and socio-cultural tools at its disposal, and enjoys global reach and influence. Given the new realities that will mark the relationship by the end of next year -- a diminished U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, continuing unilateral strikes against terrorist targets, and a credible alternate supply route to Afghanistan -- Washington can probably afford to be more bold in employing them. However, the tendency to err on the side of caution, as Schake and Miller argue, may yet prevent Washington from fully exploring viable alternatives to its current dysfunctional relationship with Pakistan. It would be a tragedy if U.S. policymakers were still engaged in similar discussions five years from now.

A Fighting Chance

The following article originally appeared in The Indian Express on September 28, 2011.

Even veteran observers of the US-Pakistan relationship — long inured to suppressed animosity — have been surprised by the severity of the latest US message and the choice of messenger. Although constituting no major revelations, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen’s testimony to a Senate committee last week, in which he accused Pakistan’s government and military of exporting terrorism, has focused public attention across the US and around the world on the growing fissures in US-Pakistan ties.

The latest accusations follow a brazen attack on the US embassy compound in Kabul, which, according to Mullen and other US officials, was planned and executed by the Haqqani network with ISI support. Mullen stated that the government of Pakistan — and in particular the army and the ISI — were using “violent extremism as an instrument of policy”. At the same hearing, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta refused to publicly detail what policies the United States were now contemplating with regards to Pakistan, when pressed by committee members.

The decline in US-Pakistan relations last year has been well-documented. The Kabul embassy attack is but the latest in a series of revelations that have shed light on Pakistan’s duplicity, following close on the heels of the outing of the CIA station chief in Pakistan, the arrest of CIA contractor Raymond Davis, several developments in China-Pakistan ties, and the killing of Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani heartland. Although an uneasy diplomatic détente might yet be possible, the overall trajectory in US-Pakistan ties is likely irreversible. It is almost impossible, for example, to envisage a US strategic relationship of the kind Pakistan has long desired, involving virtually carte blanche development aid, the provision of advanced military hardware, and limits to US cooperation with India. The growing consensus in Washington is that, over the short-term future, US-Pakistan ties will be purely transactional in nature.

But while a cold, mercenary relationship may satisfy US political and military leaders and buy Washington both time and space, it will not address the structural factors that make Pakistan a challenge to regional and global security and stability. These include a political system and notion of the national interest dictated by the army, a socio-political climate conducive to religious extremism and ethnic strife, and a willingness to incubate and employ terror as a means of advancing national objectives. Such dysfunctions will persevere, and while the United States may one day extricate itself from South Asia, India does not enjoy that luxury.

The present state of US-Pakistan relations thus presents a rare opening of sorts for New Delhi. Developments over the past five years have broadly supported India’s view of Pakistan as a hub of state-supported international terrorism under an unaccountable, untrustworthy and temerarious military leadership. So for the first time, the United States may be willing to entertain Indian policy inputs with regard to Pakistan. Although New Delhi has often been understanding of the US dependence on Pakistan, and at other times justifiably critical of its wilful blindness to Pakistani transgressions, it should now be more forthcoming in articulating what approach to Pakistan it would like to see Washington adopt. This will be a major test of the Indian strategic community’s acumen and responsiveness.

Unfortunately, there is a real danger that New Delhi will miss its chance. Turning George Santayana’s aphorism on its head, the historian Arthur Schlesinger once wrote: “Too often it is those who can remember the past who are condemned to repeat it.” Indian policy-makers, who continue to dwell far too much on the United States’ history of support for Pakistan, risk overlooking the present juncture as a ripe opportunity to shape US regional policy in India’s favour.

Palestine's Premature Bid for UN Membership

The following article originally appeared as a GMF Transatlantic Take on September 22, 2011, and was reproduced on the France 24 web site on September 23, 2011.

WASHINGTON--Despite last-minute maneuvering on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York, the tortuous Israel-Palestinian peace process is set to reach another critical juncture on Friday when the Palestinians submit a bid to seek full UN membership. Although polls indicate widespread support in the international community for a two-state solution and the creation of an independent Palestinian state, several recent developments suggest that the timing of the bid — which President Barack Obama has said the United States will block at the Security Council — could scarcely be worse from the standpoint of almost every stakeholder, including the Palestinians themselves.

Perhaps the most important such development concerns the political dispensation within the Palestinian territories. Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip — secured by popular mandate through the ballot box — has undermined the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mamoud Abbas. In fact, the UN bid seems at least partly motivated by Abbas’ attempts to consolidate his domestic constituency. And yet, rather ironically, the Palestinian Authority owes its survival in the West Bank in large part to Israel’s continuing military presence there, which acts as a bulwark against Hamas. Paradoxically, the push for UN recognition that might strengthen Abbas’ position in the short run also threatens this temporary and tenuous alliance of convenience with Israel.

A second and more recent development is the Arab Spring, which has already resulted in the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and political upheaval in Syria and Jordan. Israelis are deeply worried about populist regimes emerging in these states, which might well be inclined to greater hostility toward Israel. Their fears are not entirely unfounded: relations between Israel and Egypt — which for three decades had remained a powerful stabilizing factor in the region — are now on a downward trajectory, especially following the storming of the Israeli embassy in Cairo two weeks ago. Israel will only be in a position to accept Palestinian independence if it feels secure; the Arab Spring has had the opposite effect.

Third, the United States’ status as an honest broker is in jeopardy, following the Obama administration’s poorly-handled mediation of the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The United States’ initially strong position on a settlement building freeze angered not just Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu but also painted Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas into a corner. In Abbas’ words, “We both went up the tree. After that, [Obama] came down with a ladder and he removed the ladder and said to me, jump.” It’s a far cry from the years when former U.S. President Bill Clinton was seen as an even-handed mediator between then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasser Arafat; today, both sides feel that Washington has let them down.

The fourth development involves other external actors. The Quartet — consisting of the United Nations, European Union, United States, and Russia, but represented by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair — has proven largely ineffective as a mediating presence. Despite contributing almost half of all aid to the Palestinian Authority, Europe appears divided on what approach to take, making it harder to forge a common transatlantic policy. Meanwhile, Israel’s relations with other key players in its neighborhood — notably Turkey — have nose-dived, meaning the regional political climate is far from conducive to normalization.

An overarching problem, though, is one of priorities. A two-state solution requires a government in the Palestinian territories that is unified, stable, popularly-mandated, and status quo-oriented, but in contrast to the heady optimism of the days preceding the Second Intifada, the Palestinian Authority today checks only the status quo box. Prematurely seeking international legitimacy at the United Nations is sure to prevent progress towards a viable end state, while the disappointment resulting from a blocked UN bid may yet stoke violence.

The handling of the issue by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority has been remarkably clumsy. Neither side appears to have made adequate preparations for a soft landing after the vote. At the same time, various parties on both sides appear to be exaggerating the importance of this largely symbolic gesture for their own purposes. Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman has warned of unspecified “harsh and grave” consequences, while other Israeli leaders have suggested abandoning the moribund Oslo peace process or annexing parts of the West Bank. Meanwhile, Abbas and many supporters of the Palestinian cause have framed the vote as the ultimate litmus test for the acceptance of Palestinian statehood. The roles, it appears, have reversed. Abbas has climbed down the tree and removed the ladder. And, barring a last-minute face-saving gesture, it is the United States that might have to jump.

Can India Step Up to the Plate?

The full text of my article for the East West Center's Asia Pacific Bulletin, which was released on August 2, 2011, can be accessed here. A summary is below:

Despite several recent setbacks and a sense of stagnation in the US-India relationship, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent visit to India for the second annual US-India Strategic Dialogue exposed the breadth of the bilateral agenda and the United States' unambiguous desire for India to assume greater leadership in the Asia-Pacific. Dhruva Jaishankar...explains that while for a variety of reasons New Delhi may be constrained from taking on an exalted leadership role in the short-term, it is in both countries' interests that Washington continue to deepen its investment in India.

Jury's Prudence

The following column appeared in The Indian Express on June 16, 2011.

There has always been a tension between the compulsions of national security and those of justice, the irony being that each exists in part to preserve and advance the other. At its crudest, that tension can be captured by the cliché of a ticking time-bomb, and the debatable use of illegal interrogation techniques to determine its location, Jack Bauer-style. In an era of transnational threats such as terrorism and cyberwarfare, it is perhaps more useful to think of the dilemma in the context of determining responsibility or culpability for state-supported, cross-border crimes.

Most legal systems are based on the presumption of innocence. But this is often disregarded in the realm of national security. And with good reason. Expediency and complications pertaining to jurisdiction mean that due legal process resulting in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is often either impractical or impossible. Evidence acquired through covert or clandestine means can be compromised and, in any case, is unlikely to hold up in a court of justice. National security decisions must by their nature be based upon lower levels of probability and certitude, meaning that in effect one can sometimes be considered guilty if not proved innocent. It is little wonder then that sceptics — based on their priorities — consider international law to be everything from unnecessarily onerous to quaintly irrelevant.

The acquittal in a Chicago court of Pakistani-Canadian Tahawwur Rana on the charge of providing support to David Coleman Headley for the 2008 terrorist plot against Mumbai has elicited a curious response in India, a blend of doubt, confusion and misapprehensions about US motives. But because it is a legal, rather than a national security, decision, the jury’s verdict is ultimately of little consequence either as an indicator of US policy or as a determinant of Pakistani state or official complicity.

Rana was arrested by US law enforcement officials in 2009. A federal grand jury found reasons to indict him on charges of providing material support for the planning and execution of 26/11 attacks, for the plot against the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Denmark, and to the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Because the evidence linking Rana to the 26/11 plot was based heavily on Headley’s testimony, the credibility and motives of the prosecution’s star witness were called into question by the defence. Although Rana did indeed seem to provide cover for Headley’s visits to India, the jury apparently felt they could not determine beyond reasonable doubt that he did so fully cognisant of Headley’s intentions.

Given the independent judicial process, and the steps taken by US law enforcement officials up to and during the trial, the jury’s verdict can in no way be construed as an extension of US policy. While that may appear obvious to many in the legal, political and policy communities, it appears not to be reflected fully in popular Indian consciousness. Online commentators, newspaper columnists and even opposition political leaders have suggested, for example, that bureaucratic politics, international appeasement and even racism might have been factors in determining the outcome, the last element a result of Rana’s having been found guilty for his role in the Danish plot.

At the same time, the absence of adequate evidence in support of Rana’s willing involvement in the 26/11 plot exonerates neither the Lashkar-e-Toiba nor Pakistan’s security forces. Given the immense amount of circumstantial evidence and the efforts taken by Pakistani officials to obfuscate the truth behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the onus remains upon them to demonstrate their innocence. Tahawwur Rana may have benefited from due legal process. But others responsible for the deaths of 26/11 do not necessarily enjoy that privilege in the Star Chamber of international politics.

Mixed Signals

The following article originally appeared in The Indian Express on May 30, 2011.

The weeks since the killing of Osama bin Laden by US Special Forces have witnessed intensified recriminations and engagement between the US and Pakistan. Last week, President Barack Obama said that Pakistan’s obsession with India as an existential threat was misplaced, reiterating a theme he and his top advisers have embraced since assuming office. In doing this, the Obama administration has been attempting to assuage Pakistan’s purported insecurities vis-à-vis India in order to redirect its energies towards addressing challenges at home and along its western frontier.

There is an unwillingness on the part of the US to recognise and completely contradict Pakistan’s pernicious national narrative. This narrative has directly compromised the integrity of the Pakistani state and the well-being of its public, as well as the security of every state actively engaged in Pakistan’s neighbourhood. This narrative consists either of complete fabrications or, more frequently, half-truths or select facts bereft of context. Although often associated with the military, Pakistan’s recent diplomatic overdrive illustrates how the civilian leadership is equally culpable for its perpetuation.

Washington’s response, both before and after bin Laden’s killing, has been uneven. It has forcefully rejected certain elements of Pakistan’s narrative, its obsession with India being but one. The State Department has also made sustained attempts of late to encourage Pakistan to get its economy in order, and thus transfer responsibility to the Pakistani government for the country’s economic well-being and offset the moral hazard of international aid. Furthermore, while Washington may regularly pay lip service to Pakistani sovereignty, it is perfectly willing to interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs if they impinge on US national security interests. The US should therefore be expected to continue unilateral cross-border strikes and intervene in support of democracy despite Pakistani protestations.

At the same time, the US tacitly tolerates other elements of Pakistan’s narrative. For example, Pakistani leaders regularly state that their country remains a victim of terror, and is responsible for capturing several leading terrorists. This may be true, but it does not absolve Pakistan of either its support for terror groups acting abroad or its offers of sanctuary. Vociferous public anti-Americanism is yet another element of Pakistan’s narrative, employed to delineate limits to its manoeuvrability, yet Washington nonetheless tolerates the ISI’s sustained efforts to shape public opinion against America.

Finally, there are those elements that Washington continues to give credence to, or at least leave unquestioned: Pakistan’s insecurities are legitimately propelled by fears of encirclement, India’s growing resource base, its nuclear weapons programme, and its reported “Cold Start” doctrine, thus adequately justify Pakistan’s inordinate military spending, greater investments in its nuclear and missile programmes, and support for terror groups targeting India and Afghanistan. That lasting peace between India and Pakistan and the settlement of the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan’s satisfaction will almost entirely eliminate its insecurities. That the army remains the only secular institution in Pakistan that “works” and is therefore deserving of support. And that Pakistan’s top military and intelligence officials bear little or no responsibility for the actions of their subordinates and affiliates, a claim even less credible given revelations from the ongoing trial of Tahawwur Rana and the testimony of David Coleman Headley. The erroneous conclusion drawn by the Obama administration from such questionable assumptions is that demonstrations of Indian magnanimity will allow Pakistan’s misguided, but not necessarily malevolent, security forces to reallocate resources towards improving the country’s security and economy.

Responding to Pakistan’s narrative requires an important cognitive leap, one that most in Washington are still reluctant to take: Pakistan’s purported obsessions and insecurities are self-inflicted, created and consistently advanced to serve important private interests, almost always to the detriment of the country and its people. This applies equally to all the challenges commonly associated with Pakistan, be it the military’s political preponderance, the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, the cultivation and use of terrorist proxies against both adversaries and nominal allies, the growing radicalisation of the body politic, and periodic India-Pakistan crises. There is also little clarity regarding Pakistani pleas for a long-term strategic relationship, which it professes to desire as a symbol of legitimacy, but also works to undermine through its transactional demands and poorly concealed enthusiasm for a hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Although the US is using bin Laden’s whereabouts as leverage to extract short-term concessions, it remains unwilling to recognise the centrality of Pakistan’s self-defeating narrative and the dire need for its complete reversal, absent which the multifarious challenges associated with Pakistan are unlikely to be meaningfully addressed. This, in turn, necessitates the coordinated advancement of a counter-narrative by states whose national security interests are compromised by Pakistani misbehaviour, including India, Afghanistan and — most importantly — the US. What must be promoted is an entirely different conception of Pakistan’s national interest, including its self-identification as a non-revisionist and peaceful state wholly responsible for its own behaviour and well-being. Based on the mixed signals from Washington, it is unclear whether even the dramatic circumstances of bin Laden’s death will produce that desirable outcome.

Intelligence Design

The following article originally appeared in The Indian Express on May 5, 2011.


Based on the initial reports provided by US officials on the operation that culminated in the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, it appears to be a textbook case of gathering and analysing intelligence on “high-value targets”. Not only has the operation burnished the reputations of President Barack Obama, CIA Director Leon Panetta (soon to become secretary of defence), the CIA and the broader US intelligence community, but it also provides some valuable lessons about the collection and analysis of intelligence today.

The trail to Osama bin Laden was deemed by many American al-Qaeda experts to have gone cold after 2003, when an al-Qaeda commander reported having met him in Khost province in Afghanistan. Earlier, bin Laden had reportedly left Tora Bora for the frontier with Pakistan, but his continued absence led to suggestions that he had perished, either accidentally or from natural causes. Some CIA operatives began jokingly calling him “Elvis”, a reference to the frequently reported sightings of the singer long after his demise. In hindsight, it emerges that bin Laden was careful enough to avoid all forms of communication that might have been compromised by the United States’ sophisticated signals intelligence capabilities, including telephones and the Internet. This also proved to be the source of his downfall.

The US intelligence analysts honed in on the fact that bin Laden employed couriers to communicate with al-Qaeda’s operational commanders, at least two of whom landed in US custody. The courier network was, in the words of one Bush administration official, “the holy grail” for locating al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. The name Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti came up during interrogations at CIA “black sites” as that of one of bin Laden’s couriers. The capture of an operative in 2004 identified the mysterious al-Kuwaiti as an associate of Faraj al-Libi, who had succeeded 9/11 architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as al-Qaeda’s operational commander. After al-Libi’s capture in 2005, he seemed to confirm through his persistent denials that al-Kuwaiti was continuing to serve as bin Laden’s courier. It was only later, in 2007, that the name was reportedly recognised as the nom de guerre of the Pakistani-Kuwaiti Sheikh Abu Ahmed.

The fact that this key piece of intelligence was gathered through interrogations of detainees has already been trumpeted as a vindication of the controversial programme by former and current CIA officials, as well as by former department of justice lawyers. Although some of those interrogated as part of this process underwent the widely criticised treatment known as waterboarding, reports suggest that the relevant information for finding bin Laden was not extracted using that technique.

Once Ahmed had been identified, the next breakthrough came using signals intelligence, specifically the interception of a phone conversation between Ahmed and another individual that was being monitored by the US. This helped locate Ahmed, whose vehicle was subsequently tracked to the now-infamous compound outside Abbottabad. The design of the building clearly pointed to its use as a safe house, but it was next to impossible to determine who was living there. While the site was constantly tracked using overhead surveillance, American analysts carefully examined the intelligence and worked through the probabilities of various alternatives to bin Laden’s presence in the compound. The ultimate call came down to the US president after several options were presented to him. Evidently, the US intelligence community concluded with considerable certainty that there was a high probability of bin Laden being housed in the compound outside Abbottabad.

An obvious lesson is the continued centrality of human intelligence, or “HUMINT” in intelligence parlance. After the Cold War, the US invested considerable resources in technical collection systems, often at the expense of HUMINT. The 9/11 attacks reversed much of that. Former director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell confirmed in late 2008 that “HUMINT is back, big time”, while current DNI Jim Clapper lamented only last year that it is “still dwarfed by other disciplines”. The discovery of bin Laden’s sanctuary in Pakistan reinforces the importance of HUMINT just as it seems to have been going out of fashion.

A second lesson can be derived from the relatively seamless and complementary roles played by different collection disciplines. While interrogations produced the name and identity of bin Laden’s courier, the US employed signals and geospatial intelligence to locate the courier and then track the compound. Finally, there are lessons to be drawn from the analytical process that helped narrow the level of uncertainty regarding the compound and its inhabitants, although information about it is, at present, scarce. At the very least, “red team” exercises were conducted to explore the probabilities of other plausible explanations. Ultimately, it came down to a courageous call by the president to go ahead with the operation, despite lingering uncertainties. As we now know, it proved to be the right one.